Judicial branch · Landmark case

Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council

467 U.S. 837 (1984) · Opinion of the Court

DecidedJune 25, 1984
Vote6–0
AuthorJustice Stevens
DispositionD.C. Circuit reversed

What you should know

This page explains the Court’s holding in plain language, where the official text lives, and what to check next.

Supreme Court findings are not news summaries. The controlling document is the Court’s opinion, plus any concurrences or dissents. Use this profile to understand the holding, then verify language, syllabus, and docket history on official sources before relying on a secondary account. This ruling was overturned in 2024 — see the note below.

Holding

The Court held that when a federal statute is ambiguous or silent on a specific question, and Congress has delegated authority over that subject to a federal agency, courts should defer to the agency’s interpretation as long as it is reasonable — rather than substituting the court’s own reading. This became known as “Chevron deference,” one of the most frequently cited doctrines in American administrative law for the next 40 years.

Background

The Clean Air Act required states with unmet air-quality standards to regulate new or modified “stationary sources” of pollution. The EPA adopted a “bubble policy” letting a plant treat all its pollution-emitting equipment as one single source, so a company could add new equipment without a permit as long as its total plant-wide emissions didn’t increase. Environmental groups challenged the policy as inconsistent with the Act’s goals; the D.C. Circuit agreed and struck it down.

The Supreme Court reversed, unanimously (among the six justices who participated). Justice Stevens laid out a now-famous two-step framework: first, has Congress spoken directly to the exact question at issue? If so, that controls. If the statute is silent or ambiguous, the second question is whether the agency’s interpretation is a reasonable, permissible reading — and if so, courts must defer to it, even if the court might have read the statute differently itself.

Why this finding matters

For 40 years, the most-cited administrative law case in the country — then reversed.

Chevron deference shaped how federal regulations were written and challenged across every agency, from the EPA to the FCC. On June 28, 2024, the Supreme Court overturned Chevron in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, holding the deference framework was inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act and that courts, not agencies, must exercise independent judgment on questions of statutory interpretation.

Vote and authorship

MajorityStevens, J. (opinion of the Court)
JoinBurger, C.J., Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell
Not participatingMarshall, Rehnquist, O’Connor
Overruled byLoper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024)

If Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue… the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.

Justice Stevens · Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC

How it fits in government

Executive branch

Chevron deference gave federal agencies real, lasting latitude to interpret ambiguous statutes when writing regulations — latitude that shrank significantly after Loper Bright.

Executive

Judicial branch

The doctrine directly shaped how courts review agency action for four decades, until the Court itself reversed course in 2024.

Judicial

Legislative branch

Because agencies could fill statutory gaps under Chevron, Congress had less pressure to write highly specific legislation — a dynamic Loper Bright is expected to change.

Legislative

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